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PRIVATE CREATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF LAW: A HISTORICAL CASE
DAVID FRIEDMAN*
Iceland is known to men as a land of volcanoes, geysers and glaciers. But it
ought to be no less interesting to the student of history as the birthplace of a
brilliant literature in poetry and prose, and as the home of a people who have
maintained for many centuries a high level of intellectual cultivation. It is an
almost unique instance of a community whose culture and creative power
flourished independently of any favouring material conditions, and indeed under
conditions in the highest degree unfavourable. Nor ought it to be less interesting
to the student of politics and laws as having produced a Constitution unlike any
other whereof records remain, and a body of law so elaborate and complex, that
it is hard to believe that it existed among men whose chief occupation was to kill
one another.
James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence
263 (1901)
I. INTRODUCTION'
THE purpose of this paper is to examine the legal and political institutions
of Iceland from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. They are of interest for
two reasons. First, they are relatively well documented; the sagas were
written by people who had lived under that set of institutions2 and provide a
detailed inside view of their workings. Legal conflicts were of great interest
* Assistant Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. I would like to
especially thank Professor Jere Fleck of the Germanic Languages Department at the University
of Maryland for answering innumerable questions and Julius Margolis for his initial encour-
agement. Thanks are also due to Juergen Backhaus, for the difficult feat of translating an
Icelander's German, and to Geraldine Duncan. Finally, I am grateful to the authors and
translators of Njdls Saga, Egils Saga, Haralds Saga, Gisla Saga, and the J6msvikinga Saga.
I have been hampered in this work by my unfortunate ignorance of Old Norse. In particular
Grdgds, the earliest compilation of Icelandic law, seems never to have been translated into
English, save for a few fragments in Origines Icelandicae (Gudbrand Vigfusson & F. York
Powell trans. 1905) [hereinafter cited as Vigfusson & Powell]. A Norse scholar willing to correct
that lack would do a considerable service to those interested in the legal institutions of this
extraordinary society.
2 Most of the principal sagas were written down in the second half of the thirteenth century
or, at the latest, the first half of the fourteenth. Prior to 1262 the institutions seem to have been
relatively close to those established in the tenth century, although their workings may have been
substantially different as a result of the increased concentration of wealth and power which led
to their final collapse.
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to the medieval Icelanders; Njal, the eponymous hero of the most famous of
the sagas,3 is not a warrior but a lawyer--"so skilled in law that no one was
considered his equal." In the action of the sagas, law cases play as central a
role as battles.
Second, medieval Icelandic institutions have several peculiar and interest-
ing characteristics; they might almost have been invented by a mad econo-
mist to test the lengths to which market systems could supplant government
in its most fundamental functions. Killing was a civil offense resulting in a
fine paid to the survivors of the victim. Laws were made by a "parliament,"
seats in which were a marketable commodity. Enforcement of law was
entirely a private affair. And yet these extraordinary institutions survived
for over three hundred years, and the society in which they survived appears
to have been in many ways an attractive one. Its citizens were, by medieval
standards, free; differences in status based on rank or sex were relatively
small;4 and its literary output in relation to its size has been compared, with
some justice, to that of Athens.'
While these characteristics of the Icelandic legal system may seem pecu-
liar, they are not unique to medieval Iceland. The wergeld-the fine for
killing a man-was an essential part of the legal system of Anglo-Saxon
England, and still exists in New Guinea. 6 The sale of legislative seats has
been alleged in many societies and existed openly in some. Private enforce-
ment existed both in the American West 7 and in pre-nineteenth-century
Britain; a famous character of eighteenth-century fiction, Mr. Peachum in
Gay's "Beggar's Opera," was based on Jonathan Wild, self-titled "Thief-
Taker General," who profitably combined the professions of thief-taker,
3 Magnus Magnusson & Hermann Palsson trans., Njal's Saga (Penguin ed. 1960) [hereinafter
cited as Nial's Saga].
4 Sveinbjorn Johnson, Pioneers of Freedom (1930). A partial exception is the status of thralls,
although even they seem freer than one might expect; in one saga a thrall owns a famous sword,
and his master must ask his permission to borrow it. Carl 0. Williams, in Thraldom in Ancient
Iceland 36 (1937), estimates that there were no more than 2000 thralls in Iceland at any one
time, which would be about 3% of the population. Williams believes they were very badly
treated, but this may reflect his biases; for example, he repeatedly asserts that thralls were not
permitted weapons despite numerous instances to the contrary in the sagas. Stefansson esti-
mates the average period of servitude before manumission at only five years but does not state
his evidence. Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Icelandic Independence, Foreign Affairs, January 1929, at
270.
1 C. A. Vansittart Conybeare, The Place of Iceland in the History of European Institutions
6-8 (1877).
6 New York Times, Feb. 16, 1972, at 17, col. 6. For an extensive survey of wergeld in
Anglo-Saxon and other early societies, see Frederic Seebohm, Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon
Law (1911).
I Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not
So Wild, Wild West (1978) (staff paper in Economics, Montana State Univ. at Bozeman, Ag.
Econ. & Econ. Dept.).
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recoverer of stolen property, and large-scale employer of thieves for eleven
years, until he was finally hanged in 1725.8 The idea that law is primarily
private, that most offenses are offenses against specific individuals or fami-
lies, and that punishment of the crime is primarily the business of the injured
party seems to be common to many early systems of law and has been
discussed at some length by Maine with special reference to the early history
of Roman law.9
Medieval Iceland, however, presents institutions of private enforcement
of law in a purer form than any other well-recorded society of which I am
aware. Even early Roman law recognized the existence of crimes, offenses
against society rather than against any individual, and dealt with them, in
effect, by using the legislature as a special court. ' 0 Under Anglo-Saxon law
killing was an offense against the victim's family, his lord, and the lord of the
place whose peace had been broken; wergeld was paid to the family, man-
bote to the crown, and fightwite to the respective lords. " I British thief-takers
in the eighteenth century were motivated by a public reward of £40 per
thief. ' 2 All of these systems involved some combination of private and public
enforcement. The Icelandic system developed without any central authority
comparable to the Anglo-Saxon king; ' 3 as a result, even where the Icelandic
legal system recognized an essentially "public" offense, it dealt with it by
giving some individual (in some cases chosen by lot from those affected) the
right to pursue the case and collect the resulting fine, thus fitting it into an
essentially private system.
In the structure of its legislature, Iceland again presents an almost pure
form of an institution, elements of which exist elsewhere. British pocket
boroughs, like Icelandic goclord, represented marketable seats in the legisla-
ture, but Parliament did not consist entirely of representatives from pocket
boroughs. All golor6 were marketable and (with the exception, after Ice-
land's conversion to Christianity, of the two Icelandic bishops) all seats in
the 16gritta were held by the owners of gocord, or men chosen by them.
The early history of Iceland thus gives us a well-recorded picture of the
workings of particularly pure forms of private enforcement and creation of
law, and of the interaction between the two. Such a picture is especially
8 Marilyn E. Walsh, The Fence 17-23 (1977).
H. S. Maine, Ancient Law 355-71 (1963).
10 Id. at 360-61.
1 Seebohm, supra note 6, at 330-335; and Naomi D. Hurnard, The King's Pardon for
Homicide before A.D. 1307, at 1-5 (1969).
12 Walsh, supra note 8, at 18-19.
'3 "In no part of Anglo-Saxon England and at no time in its history is any trace to be found of
a system of government knowing nothing of the rule of kings." P. H. Blair, An Introduction to
Anglo-Saxon England 194 (2nd ed. 1977).
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interesting because elements of both have existed, and continue to exist, in
many other societies, including our own.
There are three questions in the economics of law which I believe this
history may illuminate. The first is the feasibility of private enforcement. 4
The second is the question of whether political institutions can and do gener-
ate "efficient" law. The third is the question of what laws are in fact efficient.
All three involve formidable theoretical difficulties; in the body of this paper
I limit myself to sketching the arguments, describing how the Icelandic
institutions worked, and attempting to draw some tentative conclusions.
Appendix A gives some numerical information on the scale of punishments
in Iceland, and Appendix B suggests how the Icelandic system might be
adapted to modern society.
II. THE MODERN LITERATURE
Some years ago, Becker and Stigler pointed out that a system of private
enforcement of law, in which the person who caught a criminal received the
fine paid by the offender, would have certain attractive characteristics;' 5 in
particular, there would be no incentive for bribery of the enforcer by the
criminal, since any bribe that it paid the criminal to offer it would pay the
enforcer to refuse.' 6 The argument was criticized by Landes and Posner;
they argued that since the level of fine determined both the "price" of crimi-
nal activities to the criminal and the "price" of enforcement activities, it
could not in general be set at a level which would optimize both criminal and
enforcement activities.' 7 They further argued that enforcement had a posi-
tive externality (raising the probability of catching a criminal, hence lower-
ing total crime) which would not be internalized by the enforcer; this effect
by itself would tend to lead to suboptimal enforcement.
The first argument may well be correct; since government enforcement
also provides no guarantee of optimality, it leaves open the question of
which system is superior, as Landes and Posner pointed out. This is an
empirical question and one on which the Icelandic case may provide some
evidence. Landes and Posner's second argument shows insufficient ingenuity
in constructing hypothetical institutions. If "enforcers" contract in advance
"4 This question is discussed at some length in modern libertarian or anarcho-capitalist
writings. See David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom (1973); and Murray N. Rothbard,
For a New Liberty (1973).
Is Gary Becker & George Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1974).
16 This is not quite true. Since the trial process might impose costs on the criminal, such as
uncertainty and unreimbursed time, he might be willing to pay the enforcer more than the
expected value of the fine. In this case, bribery is an efficient substitute for the court process.
17 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1975).
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to pursue those who perpetrate crimes against particular people, and so
notify the criminals (by a notice on the door of their customers), the deterrent
effect of catching criminals is internalized; the enforcers can charge their
customers for the service. Such arrangements are used by private guard
firms and the American Automobile Association, among others. The AAA
provides its members with decals stating that, if the car is stolen, a reward
will be paid for information leading to its recovery. Such decals serve both as
an offer to potential informants and as a warning to potential thieves. Under
medieval Icelandic institutions, who was protected by whom was to a con-
siderable degree known in advance.
Another difficulty with private enforcement is that some means must be
found to allocate rights to catch criminals-otherwise one enforcer may
expend resources gathering evidence only to have the criminal arrested at the
last minute by someone else. This corresponds to the familiar "commons"
problem. One solution in the literature' 8 is to let the right to prosecute a
criminal be the private property of the victim; by selling it to the highest
bidder he receives some compensation for the cost of the crime. This de-
scribes precisely the Icelandic arrangements.
Posner has asserted at some length' 9 that current common law institutions
have produced economically efficient law. I will argue that while that may or
may not be true of those institutions, there are reasons why the Icelandic
institutions might be expected to produce such law. Two specific features of
"efficient" law in the Icelandic system which I will discuss are efficient
punishment and the distinction between civil and criminal offenses.
III. HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS
In the latter half of the ninth century, King Harald Fairhair unified
Norway under his rule. A substantial part of the population left;20 many
went either directly to Iceland, which had been discovered a few years
before, or indirectly via Norse colonies in England, Ireland, Orkney, the
Hebrides, and the Shetland Islands. The political system which they devel-
oped there was based on Norwegian (or possibly Danish 21 ) traditions but
with one important innovation-the King was replaced by an assembly of
local chieftains. As in Norway (before Harald) there was nothing corre-
sponding to a strictly feudal bond. The relationship between the Icelandic
godi and his thingmen (Pingmenn) was contractual, as in early feudal rela-
18 Id. at 34.
19 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed. 1977).
20 Some estimates put it at about 10%.
21 Barthi Guthmundsson, The Origin of the Icelanders (Lee M. Hollander trans. 1967),
argues that the settlers were in large part Danes who had colonized in Norway and thus brought
Danish institutions with them to Iceland.
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tionships, but it was not territorial; the go~i had no claim to the thingman's
land and the thingman was free to transfer his allegiance.
At the base of the system stood the godi (pl. godar) and the gocor6 (pl.
godor6). A go i was a local chief who built a (pagan) temple and served as
its priest; the gotor6 was the congregation. The goci received temple dues
and provided in exchange both religious and political services.
Under the system of laws established in A.D. 930 and modified somewhat
thereafter, these local leaders were combined into a national system. Iceland
was divided into four quarters, and each quarter into nine gocorC1.22 Within
each quarter the goLord were clustered in groups of three called things.
Only the gocar owning these gocor6 had any special status within the legal
system, although it seems that others might continue to call themselves goci
(in the sense of priest) and have a goor6 (in the sense of congregation); to
avoid confusion, I will hereafter use the terms goci and go&or0 only to refer
to those having a special status under the legal system.
The one permanent official of this system was the 16gs6gumar or law-
speaker; he was elected every three years by the inhabitants of one quarter
(which quarter it was being chosen by lot). His job was to memorize the
laws, to recite them through once during his term in office, to provide advice
on difficult legal points, and to preside over the 16gritta, the "legislature."
The members of the 16gritta were the gocar, plus one additional man
from each thing, plus for each of these two advisors. Decisions in the 16gr~tta
were made, at least after the reforms attributed to Njal, by majority vote,
subject apparently to attempts to first achieve unanimity.23
The laws passed by the l6gr~tta were applied by a system of courts, also
resting on the godar. At the lowest level were private courts, the members
being chosen after the conflict arose, half by the plaintiff and half by the
defendant--essentially a system of arbitration. Above this was the thing
court or "Varthing", the judges24 in which were chosen twelve each by the
godar of the thing, making thirty-six in all. Next came the quarter-thing for
22 In the northern quarter there were twelve go&r6; the rules for membership in the l6gritta
and the appointment of judges were modified to compensate for this fact, so that the northern
quarter had the same number of seats as each of the other three quarters. I shall ignore the
resulting complications (and some other details of the system) in the remainder of the descrip-
tion. I shall also ignore the disputed question of which features were in the original system and
which were added by modifications occurring between A.D. 930 and c. A.D. 1000.
23 Conybeare, supra note 5, at 95 ns.; and 1 Vigfusson & Powell, supra note 1, bk. 2, § 3, at
343-344.
24 The Icelandic judges correspond more nearly to the jurymen of our system than to the
judge, since it was up to them to determine guilt or innocence. Conybeare, supra note 5, at 146.
There was no equivalent of our judge; individual experts in the law could be consulted by the
court. According to Sigurdur A. Magnusson, Northern Sphinx 14 (1977), "Since every breach of
the law had a fixed fine, the judges merely had to decide whether the culprit was guilty or
innocent." The 16gritta had the power to reduce sentences.
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disputes between members of different things within the same quarter; these
seem to have been little used and not much is known about them. 25 Above
them were the four quarter courts of the Althing (Al/ingi) or national
assembly-an annual meeting of all the godar each bringing with him at
least one-ninth of his thingmen. Above them, after Njal's reforms, was the
fifth court. Cases undecided at any level of the court system went to the next
level; at every level (except the private courts) the judges were appointed by
the gocar, each quarter court and the fifth court having judges appointed by
the go(Yar from all over Iceland. 2 6 The fifth court reached its decision by
majority vote; the other courts seem to have required that there be at most
six (out of thirty-six) dissenting votes in order for a verdict to be given. 27
The goconr6 itself was in effect two different things. It was a group of
men-the particular men who had agreed to follow thatgoti, to be members
of that gotor6. Any man could be challenged to name his go0ori5 and was
required to do so, but he was free to choose any go~i within his quarter and
to change to a different go 0ord at will. 28 It was also a bundle of rights-the
right to sit in the 1grtta, appoint judges for certain courts, etc. The go 0ord
in this second sense was marketable property. It could be given away, sold,
held by a partnership, inherited, or whatever. 29 Thus seats in the law-
making body were quite literally for sale.
I have described the legislative and judicial branches of "government" but
have omitted the executive. So did the Icelanders. The function of the courts
was to deliver verdicts on cases brought to them. That done, the court was
finished. If the verdict went against the defendant, it was up to him to pay
the assigned punishment-almost always a fine. If he did not, the plaintiff
could go to court again and have the defendant declared an outlaw. The
killer of an outlaw could not himself be prosecuted for the act; in addition,
anyone who gave shelter to an outlaw could be prosecuted for doing so.
25 Conybeare, supra note 5, at 48.
26 Id. at 50-51. But Sveinbjorn Johnson, supra note 4, at 64; and James Bryce, Studies in
History and Jurisprudence 274 (1901), state that the judges of the quarter court were appointed
only by the godar of that quarter.
21 Magnusson supra note 24, at 14; and Conybeare, supra note 5, at 95 ns., both interpret the
requirement for the lower courts as no more than six dissenting votes. If this was not achieved,
the case was undecided and could be taken to a higher court. While there does not seem to have
been anything strictly equivalent to our system of appeals, claims that a case had been handled
illegally in one court could be resolved in a higher court. In a famous case in Njdlssaga the
defendant tricks the prosecution into prosecuting him in the wrong court (by secretly changing
his go~orO, and hence his quarter) in order to be able to sue the prosecutors in the fifth court for
doing so. Id. at 93-94; Njal's Saga, supra note 3, at 309-310. Similarly, if a private court was
unable to reach a verdict, or in cases of "contempt of court, disturbance of the proceedings by
violence, brawling, crowding, etc.," or if the plaintiff was unwilling to submit the case to a
private court, it went to the appropriate public court instead. Conybeare, supra note 5, at 77.
28 Id. at 33-34, 47; Bryce, supra note 26, at 268-69.
29 Conybeare, supra note 5, at 28.
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Prosecution was up to the victim (or his survivors). If they and the of-
fender agreed on a settlement, the matter was settled. 30 Many cases were
settled by arbitration, including the two most serious conflicts that arose
prior to the final period of breakdown in the thirteenth century. If the case
went to a court, the judgment, in case of conviction, would be a fine to be
paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
In modern law the distinction between civil and criminal law depends on
whether prosecution is private or public; in this sense all Icelandic law was
civil. But another distinction is that civil remedies usually involve a transfer
(of money, goods, or services) from the defendant to the plaintiff, whereas
criminal remedies often involve some sort of "punishment." In this sense the
distinction existed in Icelandic law, but its basis was different.
Killing was made up for by a fine. For murder a man could be outlawed,
even if he was willing to pay a fine instead. In our system, the difference
between murder and killing (manslaughter) depends on intent; for the
Icelanders it depended on something more easily judged. After killing a
man, one was obliged to announce the fact immediately; as one law code
puts it: "The slayer shall not ride past any three houses, on the day he
committed the deed, without avowing the deed, unless the kinsmen of the
slain man, or enemies of the slayer lived there, who would put his life in
danger."'3' A man who tried to hide the body, or otherwise conceal his
responsibility, was guilty of murder.
32
IV. ANALYSIS
One obvious objection to a system of private enforcement is that the poor
(or weak) would be defenseless. The Icelandic system dealt with this prob-
lem by giving the victim a property right-the right to be reimbursed by the
criminal-and making that right transferable. The victim could turn over
his case to someone else, either gratis or in return for a consideration. 33 A
man who did not have sufficient resources to prosecute a case or enforce a
verdict could sell it to another who did and who expected to make a profit in
both money and reputation by winning the case and collecting the fine. This
meant that an attack on even the poorest victim could lead to eventual
punishment.
A second objection is that the rich (or powerful) could commit crimes with
impunity, since nobody would be able to enforce judgment against them.
30 But according to Johnson, supra note 4, at 112, for certain serious offenses the plaintiff was
liable to a fine if he compromised his suit after it had been commenced.
31 Quoted by Conybeare, supra note 5, at 78 ns., from the Gulaking Code.
32 For a discussion of the contrast between Icelandic and (modern) English ideas of murder,
see id. at 78-81.
33 For examples, see Njal's Saga, supra note 3, at 75, 151.
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Where power is sufficiently concentrated this might be true; this was one of
the problems which led to the eventual breakdown of the Icelandic legal
system in the thirteenth century.3 4 But so long as power was reasonably
dispersed, as it seems to have been for the first two centuries after the system
was established, this was a less serious problem. A man who refused to pay
his fines was outlawed and would probably not be supported by as many of
his friends as the plaintiff seeking to enforce judgment, since in case of
violent conflict his defenders would find themselves legally in the wrong. If
the lawbreaker defended himself by force, every injury inflicted on the parti-
sans of the other side would result in another suit, and every refusal to pay
another fine would pull more people into the coalition against him.
There is a scene in Njal's Saga that provides striking evidence of the
stability of this system. Conflict between two groups has become so intense
that open fighting threatens to break out in the middle of the court. A leader
of one faction asks a benevolent neutral what he will do for them in case of a
fight. He replies that if they are losing he will help them, and if they are
winning he will break up the fight before they kill more men than they can
afford!3" Even when the system seems so near to breaking down, it is still
assumed that every enemy killed must eventually be paid for. The reason is
obvious enough; each man killed will have friends and relations who are still
neutral-and will remain neutral if and only if the killing is made up for by
an appropriate wergeld.
I suggested earlier that one solution to the externality problem raised by
Landes and Posner was to identify in advance the enforcer who would deal
with crimes committed against a potential victim. In Iceland this was done
by a system of existing coalitions--some of them godor6T, some clearly
defined groups of friends and relatives. If a member of such a coalition was
killed, it was in the interest of the other members to collect wergeld for him
even if the cost was more than the amount that would be collected; their own
" The question of why the system eventually broke down is both interesting and difficult. I
believe that two of the proximate causes were increased concentration of wealth, and hence
power, and the introduction into Iceland of a foreign ideology-kingship. The former meant
that in many areas all or most of the gotor6 were held by one family and the latter that by the
end of the Sturlung period the chieftains were no longer fighting over the traditional quarrels of
who owed what to whom, but over who should eventually rule Iceland. The ultimate reasons
for those changes are beyond the scope of this paper.
35 "But if you are forced to give ground, you had better retreat in this direction, for I shall
have my men drawn up here in battle array ready to come to your help. If on the other hand
your opponents retreat, I expect they will try to reach the natural stronghold of Almanna Gorge
• . I shall take it upon myself to bar their way to this vantage ground with my men, but we
shall not pursue them if they retreat north or south along the river. And as soon as I estimate
that you have killed off as many as you can afford to pay compensation for without exile or loss
of your chieftaincies, I shall intervene with all my men to stop the fighting; and you must then
obey my orders, if I do all this for you." Njal's Saga, supra note 3, at 296-97. A similar passage
occurs id. at 162-63.
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safety depended partly on their reputation for doing so. This corresponds
precisely to the solution to the problem of deterrence externality described
above.
How well do the Icelandic laws fit the ideas of "economically efficient" law
in the modern literature? 36 In Appendix A, I give some quantitative calcula-
tions on the value of various fines. Here I will discuss two qualitative fea-
tures of Icelandic law which seem to correspond closely to the prescriptions
of modern analysis.
The first is the prevalence of fines. A fine is a costless punishment; the cost
to the payer is balanced by a benefit to the recipient. It is in this respect
superior to punishments such as execution, which imposes cost but no corre-
sponding benefit, or imprisonment, which imposes costs on both the criminal
and the taxpayers.
37
The difficulty with using fines as punishments is that many criminals may
be unable to pay a fine large enough to provide adequate deterrence. The
Icelandic system dealt with this in three ways. First, the offenses for which
fines were assessed were offenses for which the chance of detection was
unity, as explained below; it was thus sufficient for the fine to correspond to
the cost of the crime, without any additional factor to compensate for the
chance of not being caught. 38 Second, the society provided effective credit
arrangements. The same coalitions mentioned above provided their mem-
bers with money to pay large fines. Third, a person unable to discharge his
financial obligation could apparently be reduced to a state of temporary
slavery until he had worked off his debt.
39
The second feature is the distinction between what I have called civil and
criminal offenses. Since civil offenses were offenses in which the criminal
made no attempt to hide his guilt, a reasonably low punishment was
sufficient to deter most of them. High punishments were reserved for crimes
whose detection was uncertain because the criminal tried to conceal his guilt.
A high punishment was therefore necessary to keep the expected punishment
36 See especially Posner, supra note 19; and Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968). Also, Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law
(1971).
37 I am here comparing the direct costs and benefits of different sorts of punishment. Both
execution and fine have the additional indirect "benefit" of deterrence. Execution has the
further indirect benefit of preventing repetition of the crime.
38 Some additional punishment might be required to compensate for the chance that a guilty
person would be acquitted on a technicality, as sometimes happened. The advantage of private
enforcement for acts where detection is easy is discussed by Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at
31-35, in the context of modern law.
39 My only source for this is Williams, supra note 4, at 117-12 1. The system seems to have
differed from the later English imprisonment for debt, which served as an incentive to pay
debts but not as a means of doing so.
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(at the time the crime was committed) from being very low. 40 Further, the
difference between the two sorts of offenses provided a high "differential
punishment" for the "offense" of concealing one's crime, an offense which
imposed serious costs-both costs of detection and the punishment costs
resulting from the need to use an inefficient punishment (since no payable
fine, multiplied by a low probability of being caught, would provide a
sufficiently high deterrent).
V. GENERATING EFFICIENT LAW
Is there any reason to expect the Icelandic system to generate efficient law?
I believe the answer is a qualified yes. If some change in laws produced net
benefits, it would in principle be possible for those who supported such a
change to outbid its opponents, buy up a considerable number of godor6 ,
and legislate the change. A similar potential exists in any political system;
one may think of it as the application of the Coase theorem to law. The
effect is limited by transaction costs-which were probably large even in the
Icelandic system but, because the goclor7 was legally marketable, smaller
than under other political arrangements. 4'
A second reason is that inefficient laws provided, in some cases, incentives
for individual responses which could in turn make changes in the laws
Pareto desirable (without side payments). Suppose, for example, that the
wergeld for killing was too low-substantially below the point at which the
cost of an increase to an individual (involving the possibility that he might be
convicted of a killing and have to pay) balanced the advantages of increased
security and higher payments if a relative were killed. The individual, func-
tioning through the coalition of which he was a member, could then unilat-
erally "raise" the wergeld by announcing that if any member of the coalition
were killed, the others would kill the killer (or some other member of his
coalition, if he were not accessible) and let the two wergelds cancel. This is
essentially what happens in the famous "killing match" in Njal's Saga,
where Hallgerd and Bergthora alternately arrange revenge killings while
40 This may be only an approximate statement. The sagas describe many miscarriages of
justice, including outlawry based on relatively minor offenses. Here as elsewhere I am trying to
distinguish what the rules were from how they may sometimes have been applied, partly
because I believe that misapplications probably became common only in the later years, as part
of the general collapse of the system described in the Sturlung sagas. Since most of the sagas
were written during or shortly after the Sturlung period, I regard their description of that period
as accurate and their description of the earlier "saga" period as somewhat exaggerating the
resemblance between the two periods. They portray the Sturlung period as one in which justice
was less common than in the saga period, and much less common than in the period between the
two.
41 For a description of a very different system of private production of law (by lawyers), see
Maine, supra note 9, at 32-41. There seems no obvious reason to expect the Roman system he
describes to generate efficient law.
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their husbands, Njal and Gunnar, pass the same purse of silver back and
forth between them. 42 Once such policies became widespread, it would be in
the interest of everyone, potential killers, potential victims, and potential
avengers, to raise the legal wergeld. And even before the legal wergeld was
raised, killers would begin offering higher payments (as part of "out-of-
court" settlements) to prevent revenge killings. 4 3
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to draw any conclusion from the Icelandic experience con-
cerning the viability of systems of private enforcement in the twentieth
century. Even if Icelandic institutions worked well then, they might not
work in a larger and more interdependent society. And whether the Icelan-
dic institutions did work well is a matter of controversy; the sagas are
perceived by many as portraying an essentially violent and unjust society,
tormented by constant feuding. It is difficult to tell whether such judgments
are correct. Most of the sagas were written down during or after the Sturlung
period, the final violent breakdown of the Icelandic system in the thirteenth
century. Their authors may have projected elements of what they saw
around them on the earlier periods they described. Also, violence has always
been good entertainment, and the saga writers may have selected their mate-
rial accordingly. Even in a small and peaceful society novelists might be able
to find, over the course of three hundred years, enough conflict for a consid-
erable body of literature.
The quality of violence, in contrast to other medieval literature, is small in
scale, intensely personal (every casualty is named), and relatively straight-
forward. Rape and torture are uncommon, the killing of women almost
unheard of; in the very rare cases when an attacker burns the defender's
home, women, children, and servants are first offered an opportunity to
leave. 44 One indication that the total amount of violence may have been
relatively small is a calculation based on the Sturlung sagas. During more
than fifty years of what the Icelanders themselves perceived as intolerably
violent civil war, leading to the collapse of the traditional system, the aver-
age number of people killed or executed each year appears, on a per capita
basis, to be roughly equal to the current rate of murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter in the United States.
4 5
42 Njal's Saga, chs. 36-45, at 98-119.
43 One common procedure was for the defendant to offer the plaintiff "self-judgment"-the
right to set the fine himself.
44 Einar Olafur Sveinsson, The Age of the Sturlungs 68, 73 (J6hann S. Hannesson trans.
1953) (Islandica vol. 36); Njal's Saga 266.
45 Id. at 72 gives an estimate of three hundred and fifty killed in battle or executed during a
fifty-two-year period (1208-1260). The population of Iceland was about seventy thousand. For
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Whatever the correct judgment on the Icelandic legal system, we do know
one thing: it worked-sufficiently well to survive for over three hundred
years. In order to work, it had to solve, within its own institutional struc-
ture, the problems implicit in a system of private enforcement. Those solu-




Two different monies were in common use in medieval Iceland. One was silver,
the other wadmal (vaimdl), a woolen cloth. Silver was measured in ounces (aurar)
and in marks; the mark contained eight ounces. Wadmal was of a standard width of
about a meter, and was measured in Icelandic ells (alnar) of about 56 centimeters. 4 6
The value of an ounce (evrir) of silver varied, during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, between 6 and 7 ells. 4 7 The "law ounce" was set at 6 ells;48 this appears
to have been a money of account, not an attempt at price fixing.
Grdgds, the earliest book of Icelandic written law, contains a passage setting
maximum wages-presumably an attempt to enforce a monopsonistic cartel agree-
ment by the landowning thingmen against their employees.4 9 The passage is un-
clear; borkell J6hannesson estimates from it that the farm laborer's wage, net of
room and board, amounted to about one mark of silver a year and cites another
writer who estimates it at about three-quarters of a mark.5 0 borkell J6hannesson also
states that wages (net of room and board) seem to have been low or zero at the time of
settlement but to have risen somewhat by the second half of the tenth century. He
dates Grdgds to the second half of the twelfth century, or perhaps earlier; Conybeare
gives its date as 1117.
These figures give us only a very approximate idea of Icelandic wages. The exis-
tence of maximum wage legislation suggests that the equilibrium wage was higher
than the legislated wage. s ' But wages, as lorkell J6hannesson points out, must have
the U.S. figures, see Michael S. Hindelang et. al., Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-
1976, at 443 (1977).
46 Marta Hoffman, The Warp-Weighted Loom 213 (1964).
41 Knut Gjerset, History of Iceland 206 (1924).
48 Njal's Saga 41, trans. n. Also Iorkell J6hannesson, Die Stellung der Freien Arbeiter in
Island 37 (1933).
41 Id. at 207-208.
50 Id. at 211.
I' The existence of maximum wage legislation raises a problem for my thesis that the Icelan-
dic system generated efficient law. The simplest answer is that I do not expect to see perfectly
efficient law. Maximum wage legislation can most naturally be interpreted as a cartel arrange-
ment among the landowners; such an arrangement may well be in their interest, provided that
the farm workers are unable, for organizational reasons connected with the public-good prob-
lem, to combine in order to bribe the landowners to repeal the legislation or, within the
Icelandic system, to buy sufficient goOor6 to repeal it themselves.
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varied considerably with good and bad years; the legislation might be an attempt to
hold wages in good years to a level below equilibrium but above the average wage.
I have attempted another and independent estimate of wages, based on the fact
that one of the two monetary commodities was woolen cloth, a material which is
highly labor intensive. If we knew how many hours went into spinning and weaving
an ell of wadmal, we could estimate the market wage rate; if it takes y hours to
produce one ell, then the wage of the women making cloth (including the value of any
payment in kind they receive) should be about l/y.
I have estimated y in two ways-from figures given by Hoffman for the productiv-
ity of Icelandic weavers using the same technology at later periods,5 2 and from
estimates given me by Geraldine Duncan, who has herself worked with a warp-
weighted loom and a drop spindle, the tools used by medieval Icelandic weavers.5 3
Both methods lead to imprecise results: the first because reports disagree and also
because the sources are vague whether the time given is for weaving only or for both
weaving and spinning, the second because Mrs. Duncan did not know the precise
characteristics of wadmal, or precisely how the skill of medieval Icelandic weavers
compared with her own. My conclusion is that it took about a day to spin and weave
an ell of wadmal; this estimate could easily be off by a factor of two in either
direction. If we assume that, in a relatively poor society such as Iceland, a consider-
able portion of the income of an ordinary worker went for room and board, this figure
is consistent with that given in Grdgds.
A rough check on these estimates of wages is provided by the fact that the log-
sogumatr received an annual salary of 200 ells of wadmal, plus a part of the fines for
certain minor offenses. While his position was not a full-time one, it involved more
than just the two weeks of the Althing; he was required to give information on the
law to all comers. Since the man chosen for the post was an unusually talented
individual, it does not seem unreasonable that the fixed part of his salary (which,
unlike the wages discussed before, did not include room and board) amounted to five
year's wages, or an amount of wadmal which would have taken about ten months to
produce. Thus, this figure is not inconsistent with my previous estimate of wages.
It is interesting to note that during the Sturlung period, when wealth had become
relatively concentrated, the richest men had a net worth of about three to four
hundred year's production of wadmal-or about a thousand cows. The former figure
would correspond today to about six million dollars, but the latter to only a few
hundred thousand-wages having risen considerably more, over the last millenium,
than the price of cattle.
Table 1 gives values for a number of things in ounces, ells, years of production of
wadmal, and years of wages. The ounce is assumed to be worth six ells, the year's
production of wadmal to be three hundred ells (three hundred days at one ell/day)
and the year's wage to be one mark of forty-eight ells.
Wergeld for a thrall, the price of a thrall, and the manumission price of a thrall
were all equal, as might be expected. The price of a thrall presumably represents the
capitalized value of his production net of room and board. It seems at first surprising
52 Hoffman, supra note 46, at 215-16.
S3 Private communication.
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that this should amount to only a year and a half of wages (also net of room and
board), but we must remember that wages, according to lorkell J6hanneson, were
lower in the early period, when thralldom was common; thralldom disappeared in
Iceland by the early twelfth century, about when Grdgds was being written.
It is worth noting that the wergeld for a thrall was considerably lower than for a
free man. This is to be expected. The wergeld for a thrall was paid to his master and
it was his master, not the thrall, who had some part in the political bargaining
process by which, I have argued, wergelds were set. The value of a thrall to his
master would be the capitalized value of his net product. But the value of a free man
to himself and his family includes not only his net product but also the value to him of
being alive. Food and board, in other words, are expenses to the owner of a thrall but
consumption to a free man. Furthermore, one would expect that the costs of the
thrall to the owner would include costs of guarding and supervision that would not
apply to the free man's calculation of his own value.
If we interpret the "ounce" of Njal's Saga as a legal ounce, the usual wergelds for
free men again seem somewhat low, ranging from 12 year's wages for an ordinary
man to twice that for a man of some importance.5 4 Here again, we must remember
that there is considerable uncertainty in our wage figures. Twelve and a half years'
wages might be a reasonable estimate of the value of a man to his family, assuming a
market interest rate of between 5 and 10 percent, but it hardly seems to include much
allowance for his value to himself. If we accept the interpretation in Magnusson and
Palsson 55 of the ounce in which the wergelds of Njal's Saga are paid as an ounce of
unrefined silver, worth four legal ounces, the figures seem more reasonable.
APPENDIX B
The first step in applying the Icelandic system of private enforcement to a modern
society would be to convert all criminal offenses into civil offenses, making the
offender liable to pay an appropriate fine to the victim. In some cases, it might not be
obvious who the victim was, but that could be specified by legislation. The Icelan-
ders had the same problem and took care to specify who had the right to pursue each
case, even for procedural offenses. 5 6 For some minor offenses anyone could sue;
presumably, whoever submitted his case first would be entitled to the fine. It must be
remembered that specifying the victim has the practical function of giving some-
one an incentive to pursue the case.
The second step would be to make the victim's claim marketable, so that he could
sell it to someone willing to catch and convict the offender. The amount of the claim
54 In comparing this figure with current sentencing levels for murder or manslaughter, one
must remember that killing, in Icelandic law, was distinguished from murder by the fact that
the killer "turned himself in." Thus even if the average sentence served by the convicted killers
in our society were as high as 12 years-which it surely is not-the corresponding expected
punishment would be much higher in the Icelandic case.
55 Njal's Saga, supra note 3, at 63.
56 1 Vigfusson & Powell, supra note 1, bk. 2, at 340, 356, 358-59.
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would correspond approximately to the damage caused by the crime divided by the
probability of catching the criminal. 57 In many cases it would be substantial.
Once these steps were taken, a body of professional "thief-takers" (as they were
once called in England) would presumably develop and gradually replace our present
governmental police forces.
One serious problem with such institutions is that most criminals are judgment
proof: their resources are insufficient to pay any large fine. The obvious way to deal
with this would be some variation on Icelandic debt-thralldom. An arrangement
which protects the convicted criminal against the most obvious abuses would be for
every sentence to take the form of "so many years or so many dollars." The criminal
would then have the choice of serving out the sentence in years or accepting bids for
his services. The employer making such a bid would offer the criminal some specified
working conditions (possibly inside a private prison, possibly not) and a specified rate
at which the employer would pay off the fine. In order to get custody of the criminal,
the employer would have to obtain his consent and post bond with the court for the
amount of the fine. In order for the private-enforcement system to work, it would be
necessary for most criminals to choose to work off their sentences instead of sitting
them out (since their fines provide the enforcer's incentive). This could be arranged
by appropriately adjusting the ratio between the number of years and the number of
dollars in the sentence.
There might be some crimes, such as murder, for which the appropriate fine would
be so high that the convicted killer would be unable to work it off, however unattrac-
tive the alternative. For such cases the system would break down and would have to
be supplemented by some alternative arrangement-perhaps a large bounty paid by
the state for the apprehension and conviction of murderers.
It would be beyond the scope of this article to argue the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such a system, or to compare at length its potential abuses with those of our
present system of enforcement and punishment; it would be beyond my competence
to discuss the legal problems, and in particular the constitutional objections, that
might be raised to its introduction.
57 This is only a first approximation; the optimal fine must make allowance for enforcement
costs-part of the cost of a crime is the cost of catching the criminal-and for the net cost of
collecting the fine. This is a complicated subject and beyond the scope of this paper.
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